Voting power

Shiba Classic has a DAO on Ethereum. It works, it has been used, and today nobody holds a vote — not because anyone took it away, but because voting power is something a holder creates and nobody currently has.

This page explains how to create it, what it costs, and what it is for.

It is not given out. You make it.

Holding SHIBC does not give you a vote. That surprises most people, and it is the single reason this project's governance sits unused.

Voting power lives in a second token called gSHIBC. It is a wrapper: you deposit SHIBC, you receive exactly the same number of gSHIBC, and you can reverse it whenever you like. Your SHIBC is not spent and not locked to anyone — it is held by the wrapper contract until you take it back.

Three things follow, and they are the reason this design is worth having:

• Nobody hands out voting power, and nobody can refuse it to you. There is no list, no application and no allocation.
• And nobody can change the rules of the vote either — not even the maintainer. Measured against the DAO in August 2026: the permissions to change the voting settings, to upgrade the voting plugin, and to act as root all sit with the DAO alone. The person running this project holds none of them.
• It tracks what you hold, not what someone recorded about you.
• It has to be claimed. A holder who never deposits has no vote, however much SHIBC they own.

You can verify that gSHIBC is a wrapper rather than a separately issued token — ask it what it sits on top of, and it answers with the SHIBC contract:

curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x70abdb199A8AF9456F847B0c705539E70B9bdde7","data":"0x6f307dc3"},"latest"]}'

The answer ends in 9562e2063122eaa4d7c2d786e7ca2610d70ca8b8. That is SHIBC.

Why a second token, and not SHIBC itself?

This is the question most people ask, and it has a concrete answer: a vote has to know what you held at the moment the proposal opened. Without that, the same tokens vote twice — buy after a proposal opens, vote, sell again; or vote, move the tokens to a second wallet, vote again.

Keeping that record costs a token something. It has to remember every balance it ever had, block by block. SHIBC remembers nothing of the sort, and it says so when you ask it:

curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'Content-Type: application/json'   -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9562e2063122eaa4d7c2d786e7ca2610d70ca8b8","data":"0x3a46b1a800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"},"latest"]}'

The answer is "error": {"code": 3, "message": "execution reverted"} — the function is not there. The same call against gSHIBC (0x70abdb…dde7 in place of the address above) returns a number instead. Both tokens answer totalSupply() perfectly well, so this is a missing capability and not a wrong address.

And SHIBC can never learn it. Ownership of the contract was renounced, so nothing about it can be changed or added — owner() returns the zero address. That is the property that makes SHIBC worth holding in the first place, and it is the same property that rules out bolting governance onto it later.

So the wrapper is not a preference. It is the only way to add the missing capability without touching a contract nobody can touch. gSHIBC keeps the history; your SHIBC stays exactly what it was, held by the wrapper until you take it back.

The way there, and back

1. Hold SHIBC in a wallet you control.
2. Open the DAO at app.aragon.org/dao/ethereum-mainnet/shiba-classic.dao.eth and connect that wallet. A dialog headed “Wrap tokens” appears on connecting — “Wrap SHIBC to get voting power.” There is no menu to hunt through.
3. Wrap. Type an amount or use the None / 25% / 50% / 75% / 100% shortcuts, then confirm. This takes exactly two transactions, and both are yours to sign. The dialog's first button says “Approve SHIBC” — that permits the contract to move that many SHIBC. The second performs the deposit. You receive the same number of gSHIBC. The dialog states the same thing this page does: “Wrapping tokens will transfer them out of your wallet to the wrapping contract, where they can be withdrawn back to your wallet at any time.”
4. Vote, or open a proposal if you hold enough (below).
5. Unwrap whenever you want. That is a single transaction and it returns your SHIBC.

Three details worth knowing before you start:

• Wrapping and unwrapping cost Ethereum network fees, and nothing else. The project takes no cut — SHIBC has no transfer tax at all.
• You do not have to activate your vote afterwards. In most governance tokens, voting power stays at zero until you delegate it to yourself — a step people miss and then wonder why their vote does not count. This contract does it for you the moment you receive the wrapped tokens.
• Unwrapping during a vote does not undo your vote. Voting power is counted at the moment a proposal opens. This has happened before and changed nothing.

Those three are not descriptions of intent. They are what the deployed contract does — its code is public, and the addresses to check it against are at the end of this page.

This route has been walked in both directions and works without loss. There is nothing here to build and nothing to fix — what is missing is people using it.

What it costs

Less than most people assume, and that is the point of stating it.

The DAO requires 200,000,000,000 gSHIBC to open a proposal. Among the voting rules it was set up with, there is no minimum for simply casting a vote.

📐 Measured on 25 August 2026 against the pool that sets the price. Market values change; the figure is dated so you can recompute it rather than trust it.

So the barrier is not the threshold. Three hundred addresses already clear it, and the rest is a step nobody has explained until now.

Where it stands today

The voting token's supply is zero. It has been since 11 January 2025. One request tells you whether that is still true:

curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x70abdb199A8AF9456F847B0c705539E70B9bdde7","data":"0x18160ddd"},"latest"]}'

A result of 0x0 means nobody has wrapped. Anything else is how much of the supply can currently vote.

The full history is equally short: one proposal has ever been opened, in December 2024, on forming community work groups. Two addresses voted, both in favour. It was a signal with no on-chain action attached, so there was nothing for the contract to carry out — and it was never carried out by people either. The whitepaper describes it in full, including what it does and does not prove.

What it is for

This is the honest part, and leaving it out would make the rest useless: there is not much to vote on yet.

That is changing, and it is worth knowing what is coming, because it decides whether wrapping is worth your network fee:

• How income is split. The project is designing a contract that divides whatever it earns into fixed pots, with the shares set by vote rather than by anyone's decision. Those shares are the first real decision, and they are deliberately not printed in advance.
• Who is paid, and how much. Compensation for people working on the project is one of those pots — visible and voted on, rather than deducted before anyone sees the total.
• When the project stops being run by one person. There is a handover point, and it is now written down. Two things must both be true: the first quarter of 2027 has passed, and a proposal has been carried by at least ten addresses other than the maintainer's, together holding at least 5 % of the total supply, with no single one of them contributing more than a tenth of the supporting weight. A date alone would arrive whether or not anybody was there to take over. A threshold alone could be waited out by doing nothing.
• And no address ever carries more than a tenth of the voting weight — the maintainer's included, in every vote. Without that cap, "the community decides" and "he decides" are the same sentence.

That second-to-last one is why this page exists. The handover is not a promise about intentions; it is a threshold, and until people hold voting power the threshold cannot be reached — no matter how well anyone means it.

The addresses

Nothing on this page requires you to trust it. Every claim above is one request away.